The Detroit Tigers are 37-49. They’ve lost 14 of their last 16 games. Five starting pitchers are on the injured list. In the AL Central standings, they are in last place, five games out of even a wild card spot. The math is brutal and it doesn’t have any creative interpretations left.
They are going to trade Tarik Skubal. The only real question is how much they get back.
See our earlier breakdown of why the Tigers should sell for the broader organizational context. What I want to examine here is the price, specifically whether Detroit will recognize what it’s actually holding.
Why the Tigers Have No Choice
A 37-49 record by itself doesn’t always force a sell. Teams convince themselves of hot streaks. But three things are converging that eliminate that rationalization for Detroit.
First, the losing rate. Dropping 14 of 16 games isn’t a slump; it’s a structural collapse. Runs allowed per game, bullpen usage, lineup construction: the evidence suggests this team isn’t going to turn it around organically. Second, the rotation. Five starters on the IL means Skubal is carrying a pitching staff that barely exists below him. That context matters at the deadline, because contenders will factor in that they’re getting Skubal without meaningful surrounding pieces if they’re trading for him alone. Third — and this is the one that removes all ambiguity — Jon Heyman reported that extension talks between Skubal and the Tigers are “nil.”
https://x.com/JonHeyman/status/2057573800670011785
If there’s even a 10% chance you re-sign a two-time Cy Young winner, you can talk yourself into holding him. When that number rounds to zero, you’re a seller.
What Did the Last Great Rental Ace Cost?
The benchmark is July 30, 2015, when the Tigers traded David Price (also a contract-year arm, also an ace) to the Toronto Blue Jays. The return: Daniel Norris, Matt Boyd, and Jairo Labourt. Three prospects, none of them top-25 nationally at the time.
In hindsight, that haul was underwhelming. Norris posted a 4.73 ERA across his career. Boyd was solid but never a frontline starter. Labourt barely materialized in the majors. Detroit got three arms and none of them stuck.
Now consider what Price offered compared to Skubal. Price in 2015 was excellent, a legitimate ace. But Skubal is operating at a different altitude. Last season: 2.21 ERA, sub-2.50 FIP, 241 strikeouts, 0.89 WHIP (that led all of MLB), 6.6 WAR. Back-to-back AL Cy Young awards. This year, even after NanoScope arthroscopic elbow surgery on May 6 (a procedure so new he became the first MLB pitcher to undergo it), Skubal returned faster than anyone expected, hit 99.9 mph, and has posted a 3.06 ERA and 0.95 WHIP across 70 innings since. That number genuinely surprised me when I ran it through my projection model: a pitcher with that velocity reading post-surgery while sustaining that WHIP profile is not someone whose elbow is limiting him.
The Price comp sets a floor. Skubal’s profile sets the ceiling considerably higher.
Who Can Actually Afford the Floor Price?
Jeff Passan and Kiley McDaniel have pegged the trade probability at 85%. Passan put it plainly: “Whoever lands Skubal will pay an enormous price.” That’s not hyperbole. Robert Murray of FanSided reported that Detroit’s internal floor is at least one top-100 MLB prospect plus a team top-10 guy. That’s not a negotiating posture. That’s the minimum bid.
The Yankees are the most obvious fit. They have a rotation hole that’s cost them games and a farm system deep enough to meet that floor. The Phillies have the lineup incentive: a Phillies lineup that’s already one of the best in baseball, and they’ve shown a willingness to trade top prospects for established pitchers before. The Dodgers, Braves, Cubs, Brewers, Orioles, and Blue Jays are reportedly interested, though the first two have the deepest systems to construct a compelling package.
The market breadth actually helps Detroit. Seven or eight teams competing for one pitcher creates real leverage. The Tigers don’t need to pick a winner; they need to let those teams bid against each other until the package exceeds what any single team would offer in a one-on-one negotiation.
What Detroit Should Demand
The counterargument for holding is this: Skubal’s elbow surgery creates uncertainty, and uncertainty cuts both ways. Maybe a contender discounts him. Maybe the Tigers use that health narrative to negotiate a below-market extension. He’s 29, two-time Cy Young winner, and even at a modest discount he’d anchor any rotation for a long-term deal.
The math still says sell. An extension that worked for both sides would’ve already happened; Heyman’s reporting makes that clear. And the discount a buyer applies for a rental is lower than people assume when the arm is this elite. Buyers don’t get to wholesale devalue a two-time Cy Young winner just because he’s in his walk year. They pay for what he is, not what they wish he’d cost.
Detroit should demand: one genuine top-50 prospect nationally, a second controllable starting pitcher prospect (not a reliever), and at least one position player who’s close to MLB-ready. That’s a three-piece minimum. Given the market, it’s achievable.
The David Price return in 2015 was three pitchers, none of whom became stars. Detroit got burned partly because they didn’t maximize leverage in a thinner market. The 2026 market is deeper, Skubal is better than Price was, and August 3 is three weeks away.
Give me the Phillies. They have the lineup that can actually use a Skubal rental to win a World Series, and they have enough young pitching depth to build a return package that meets Detroit’s floor without gutting their system entirely. That combination (championship window alignment plus farm system depth) is exactly what Detroit should be optimizing for.
The Tigers held Skubal through a rebuild. The rebuild didn’t work. Now they get to define the next five years of the franchise with one phone call. The evidence says make it count.
